University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Marine Affairs Faculty Publications

Marine Affairs

2019

The Ocean Governance Regime
Elizabeth Mendenhall
University of Rhode Island, mendenhall@uri.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/maf_facpubs

Terms of Use
All rights reserved under copyright.
Citation/Publisher Attribution
Mendenhall, E. (2019). The Ocean Governance Regime: International Conventions and Institutions. In P.
Harris (Ed.), Climate Change and Ocean Governance: Politics and Policy for Threatened Seas (pp. 27-42).
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/9781108502238.002
Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108502238.002

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Marine Affairs at DigitalCommons@URI. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Marine Affairs Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

2
The Ocean Governance Regime
International Conventions and Institutions
ELIZABETH M ENDENHALL

Introduction
Like the ocean itself, the international institutions and organizations tasked with
governing maritime activities are sprawling and complex. The contemporary ocean
governance regime comprises the rules, norms, principles, and decision-making procedures designed to collectively manage the myriad users and multiple uses of the
Earth’s oceans. The regime itself has a rich and storied history, culminating in a ﬂurry
of regime-building activities in the second half of the twentieth century. In general,
ideas about the collective governance of ocean space emerged alongside growth in
human activities on and under the seas, and as the intensity of uses increased, so, too,
did the calls for formulating international consensus about the status of marine space
and maritime resources. This chapter reviews the historical development and contemporary status of the ocean governance regime. It lays the foundation for deeper
analyses of climate change and ocean governance in subsequent chapters.

Customary International Law
The basic principles of contemporary ocean governance evolved out of centuries of
state practice and jurisprudential debates, especially among the early modern
Europeans, who elaborated and systematized customary international laws of the
sea. Although Hugo Grotius is widely touted as the progenitor of the “freedom of
the seas” principle, this concept has important antecedents in the ancient Indian
Ocean trading system and Roman ideas about the status of the Mediterranean
(Anand, 1983). A competing principle – the idea of a territorial sea that is owned
and/or controlled by a coastal state – can be traced back to medieval claims over
coastal European seas, and early modern declarations of dominion over broad
swaths of the Atlantic by English and Iberian powers (Fulton, 1976). In his later
works Grotius himself contributed to the idea that any area that could be physically
controlled could be politically claimed, and this more limited notion of the territorial
sea became embedded in state proclamations and practice starting in the eighteenth
century. The contemporary ocean governance regime reﬂects a balance or compromise
between these two competing principles: freedom of the seas and territorialization.
27
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Another centuries-old customary international law of the sea is the practice of
national ﬂagging, whereby each ship must ﬂy the national ﬂag of the state under
whose jurisdiction it falls. Although ﬂags and other banners had been used as symbols of afﬁliation since ancient times, the practice of national registration originated
in early modern Europe as part of taxation schemes related to maritime trade and
was ﬁrst codiﬁed by the British (Mansell, 2009). The “ﬂag state” norm developed in
part through efforts to control and eradicate piracy and privateering during the
modern period. The national ﬂag requirement aided in the identiﬁcation of pirates,
while deﬁning the ﬂag as a symbol of sovereign jurisdiction, but not sovereign violence, was a key part of the de-legitimization of privateering (Thomson, 1994).
Although these customary international laws are reﬂected in the contemporary
ocean governance regime, the bulk of what we now call the “law of the sea” was
negotiated and adopted by the international community in the last century. After
World War II, increasing ocean use prompted a series of unilateral national claims
and caused several visible environmental and ecological disasters. The need for more
detailed and comprehensive rules became apparent, and under the auspices of the
United Nations, the international community constructed a detailed and weighty
architecture to manage the ocean. In particular, the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) serves as a framework or umbrella institution for
ocean governance by empowering, coordinating and complementing other agreements related to maritime activities. This chapter will review this and other basic
components of the contemporary ocean governance regime, focusing on the institutions (bodies of rules and norms), organizations (empowered agencies) and legal
instruments tasked with achieving shared interests and solving collective problems in
the vast ocean.

International Organizations
Several international agreements related to ocean governance were negotiated and
implemented prior to UNCLOS, but most were eventually subsumed or replaced by
it. Two important exceptions are the International Whaling Commission and the
International Maritime Organization, which have evolved and grown alongside and
complementary to the UNCLOS-centered ocean regime. These organizations are
referred to indirectly in the UNCLOS text as “competent international organizations” through which the duties of state parties can be pursued and fulﬁlled.
International Whaling Commission
The International Whaling Commission (IWC) was established as a voluntary membership organization in 1946, with the goal of developing the commercial whaling
industry while avoiding unsustainable whaling practices. In the ﬁrst several decades
of its operation, the IWC failed to prevent the serial collapse of whale populations.
Its single global quota system (undivided by states) encouraged over-capitalization

The Ocean Governance Regime: International Conventions and Institutions

29

by whalers competing for a diminishing number of whales (Kalland and Moeran,
1992: 12). Speciﬁc quotas were difﬁcult to set and enforce. The IWC depended on
unreliable catch information provided by whalers themselves, and cetologists (zoologists who study whales and dolphins) had neither the data nor the consensus models
required to make authoritative statements about the status of whale stocks
(Peterson, 1992: 161).
In the 1970s, major shifts in the membership and institutional structure of the
IWC changed this approach to the management of whaling. In 1972, the Stockholm
Conference adopted Resolution 33, calling for a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling. The United States presented this idea to the IWC, where it was rejected
(Miyaoka, 2013: 31). Instead, in 1974 new procedures in the IWC Scientiﬁc
Committee mandated the collection of more data and reﬁnement of scientiﬁc models
in order to strengthen the relationship between scientiﬁc information and decision
making (Peterson, 1992: 164). During the late 1970s and early 1980s, a successful
campaign by environmentalists and anti-whaling governments, especially that of the
United States, encouraged more states to become IWC members. Although many of
these states joined for domestic reasons, their presence tipped IWC decision making
in favor of non-whaling states and anti-whaling interests (Stoett, 1997: 66). By 1982,
the majority of IWC members had no involvement in whaling, thereby shifting the
balance of opinion against whaling. The IWC voted to introduce a moratorium on
commercial whaling starting in 1986.
The moratorium on commercial whaling persists today, although several whaling
states have taken advantage of options to avoid compliance. The IWC rules allow
violations in the case of formal objections. These have been ﬁled by several states.
The moratorium also contains an exception for whaling for the purposes of scientiﬁc
research. This has been claimed by Japan, Iceland, and Norway, although the scientiﬁc merit of their whale kills is dubious. Another exception is aboriginal subsistence
whaling, which takes place in Greenland, Russia, the United States and St. Vincent
and the Grenadines. Despite these exceptions, the IWC moratorium on commercial
whaling is understood to be durable, and a return to large-scale whaling appears to be
inconceivable in contemporary society (Stoett, 1997: 77). The IWC remains the central
institution for whaling issues, a status reafﬁrmed in Article 65 of the UNCLOS.
International Maritime Organization
The International Maritime Organization (IMO) is an inter-governmental organization and a specialized regulatory agency of the United Nations. In 1948, the ﬂedgling United Nations drafted a convention to establish the Inter-Governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), which entered into force in 1958. The
goals outlined in the founding convention focused on promoting free access and
non-discrimination in international shipping, with a secondary interest in maritime
safety. The convention has been modiﬁed several times to clarify and extend the
organization’s purview and to alter its functions in line with changes in shipping
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technology and the interests of member states. In the late 1970s, amendments to the
convention deleted the article that described IMCO functions as merely “consultative and advisory,” added the prevention of marine pollution to the list of goals and
changed the name of the IMCO to the “International Maritime Organization.”
The IMO enjoys broad participation. In addition to 172 member states, 79 international non-governmental organizations have consultative status. The Assembly is
the IMO’s plenary body and its highest level of decision making, which includes all
member states and meets every two years. The Council is the executive organ of the
IMO, and its 32 member states manage ongoing business between Assembly sessions. Council members are chosen by the Assembly using speciﬁc criteria to ensure
representation of states with signiﬁcant interests in providing and utilizing international shipping services, and also geographical representation. Similar mechanisms
to ensure appropriate representation of interested parties are found throughout the
IMO institutional structure. Annual membership dues are calculated using a formula
that emphasizes the tonnage of the registered merchant ﬂeet. Many international
agreements negotiated under the auspices of the IMO have a “double ratiﬁcation
threshold,” such that a sufﬁcient number of states representing a speciﬁc proportion
of global registered shipping must ratify an agreement before it enters into force
(DeSombre, 2006: 74).
The IMO has been described as “quasi-legislative” because it issues codes and
recommendations to its members in addition to sponsoring and hosting intergovernmental negotiations and supporting implementation of resulting international
conventions (Chircop, 2015: 429). Within the usual functioning of the organization,
IMO member states drive the creation of guidelines, regulations and rules through a
system of committees and sub-committees. All member states may become members
of ﬁve main committees: Maritime Safety, Marine Environment Protection, Legal,
Technical Cooperation, and Facilitation. A large number of sub-committees take on
technical work, and within these, non-governmental observers advocate for speciﬁc
interests and provide technical expertise (Chircop, 2015: 425). The ongoing process
of updating maritime rules and regulations is facilitated by the IMO’s use of a “tacit
acceptance procedure” for amendments to many of its conventions (Biermann, 2014:
182). Under this procedure, an amendment automatically enters into force unless a
speciﬁed number of parties to the original agreement object before a certain date.
The IMO plays a unique role in the ocean governance regime. Its policies shape
the balance between the rights of coastal states and the “freedom of the seas” principle (Chircop, 2015: 418). For example, the IMO is responsible for evaluating and
adopting ship routing schemes proposed by coastal states for the purpose of enhancing navigational safety and avoiding marine pollution. The organization also places
conditions on the freedom of navigation. Regulations created by the IMO apply to
all kinds of vessels at sea, including ﬁshing boats and cruise ships, and IMO rules
and standards cover all parts of a regulated ship’s life cycle: design, construction,
equipment, operation, and disposal. To improve at-sea monitoring, in 2000 the IMO
made the use of Automatic Identiﬁcation Systems mandatory for all ships of a certain
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size. Although these technical and operational issues have always been a core function
of the IMO, the organization also promotes access to global shipping services.
One of the most controversial aspects of IMO governance is the so-called “ﬂags
of convenience” problem associated with ship registries. The IMO requires all ships
to be registered in a country and to ﬂy that country’s ﬂag as a signal of registry and
jurisdiction. Around the time of the IMO’s establishment, the practice of “open
registries” became more prevalent. Open registry states allow ships owned and/or
operated by nonnationals to register under their national ﬂag. Such states often
use ship registry as a source of domestic revenue, and attract ships registration with
the promise of lax enforcement of maritime regulations. Due to the existence of
these ﬂags of convenience, the system of ﬂag-state enforcement has been described
as a weakness in IMO governance (Chircop 2015: 437).
Conventions on Marine Pollution
Conventions and agreements negotiated under the auspices of the IMO cover many
topics related to maritime shipping, but those surrounding the issue of marine pollution have been especially inﬂuential in contemporary ocean governance. The right to
pollute was an “implicit freedom of the high seas” for many centuries, but in the 1920s
marine pollution from industrialized and transnational shipping networks began to
arouse international concern (Caldwell, 1990: 294; Vogler, 2000: 57). Attempts in the
1950s and 1960s to regulate oil emissions in the open ocean were thwarted by insufﬁcient monitoring and lack of infrastructure, and those attempts “had essentially no
impact on improving the marine environment” (Mitchell, 1993: 245).
In the 1970s, two conventions negotiated through the IMO directly addressed the
problems of vessel-source pollution and dumping at sea. The International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) has been lauded
for its innovative and effective requirements for reducing ship-based pollution, both
operational and accidental. The ﬁrst MARPOL agreement (1973) did not receive
sufﬁcient ratiﬁcations to enter into force due to the lobbying efforts of powerful shipping interests in maritime states (Chasek, Downie, and Brown, 2014: 24). After
modiﬁcations to assuage the concerns of opponents, a new agreement, fused with
the previous one to become MARPOL 73/78, entered into force in 1983 (DeSombre,
2006: 74).
MARPOL 73/78 introduced design requirements for oil tankers, including monitoring devices, separators (to reduce discharge) and segregated ballast tanks. The
1978 amendments to MARPOL added a requirement for washing out tanks with
crude oil itself, instead of water. These changes facilitated new, less-polluting practices related to ballast exchange and tank cleaning. The MARPOL agreement also
shifted responsibility from operators, who manage at-sea discharges, to owners, who
purchase constructed ships. Because these provisions targeted the technology itself,
instead of its operation, they shifted from the more challenging enforcement at sea
to enforcement in port (Wonham, 1996). In 1997 the MARPOL conference of
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parties adopted a new protocol that limits emissions of air pollutants and the sulfur
content of fuels. The treaty currently covers nearly 98 percent of registered global
shipping, by weight (DeSombre, 2006: 74). The MARPOL agreement is generally
regarded as a success, despite continued challenges with implementation and enforcement in the developing world (DeSombre, 2006: 75; Karim, 2010).
The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter (commonly called the London Convention), also negotiated under the auspices of the IMO, created a “black list” of substances prohibited
from dumping and a “gray list” of substances that could, under particular circumstances, be considered for dumping. The London Convention also mandated that
state parties designate an authority to issue permits for all dumping and special permits for dumping of gray-list materials. The IMO is not empowered to monitor or
enforce these rules, but the London Convention was the ﬁrst agreement to authorize
coastal states to enforce its provisions (Caldwell, 1990, 146; Chasek, Downie, and
Brown, 2014, 24). Article 210 of UNCLOS enjoins member states to adopt national
laws and regulations that are at least as effective as “global rules and standards” for
marine dumping, which has typically been taken to mean the London Convention.
In 1996, a meeting of the parties to the London Convention adopted the London
Protocol, which was intended to modify, update and eventually replace the London
Convention. The London Protocol adopted the precautionary approach by prohibiting all dumping, except of those materials specially authorized by a formal list.
Materials eligible for consideration – after assessment and licensing – include dredged
material, manmade vessels and platforms, ﬁsh wastes, and sewage sludge. In addition
to the positive listing approach, the London Protocol contains several other innovations when compared to the London Convention, including enhanced reporting
requirements, a formalized dispute settlement procedure and a slightly broader deﬁnition of dumping. The London Protocol is also more adaptive and dynamic, and it has
included amendments regarding marine geo-engineering (see Chapter 26) and carbon
capture and sequestration in the seabed. Yet despite these advancements, the London
Protocol did not succeed in replacing the London Convention, and it attracted relatively few state ratiﬁcations. The two conventions now exist alongside one another in
an unusual informal arrangement described as “two treaties, one family.” The governing bodies of each agreement typically hold joint meetings, although the majority of
states in attendance have ratiﬁed only one of the treaties (Hong and Lee, 2015).
Although MARPOL and the London Convention and Protocol represent signiﬁcant strides in the international regulation and restriction of marine pollution, they
only target pollution from shipping and dumping. Around 70 percent of marine pollution comes from land-based activities (see Chapter 21), which indirectly or unintentionally deposit toxins and debris through wind, river outﬂows, coastal runoff
and other pathways (Kirk 2015: 526). These sources of marine pollution have
received little international attention in terms of regulation, in part because it was
initially assumed that they would only have local impacts and could be effectively
controlled by coastal states (Kirk 2015: 519).
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The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (see the chapters in Part V
of this volume), also commonly referred to as the Law of the Sea Convention, is the
centerpiece of contemporary ocean governance. This expansive institution emerged
out of the third (and last) UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which was tasked
with addressing all matters pertaining to the oceans. In the decades following World
War II, a series of unilateral and inconsistent declarations of ownership and jurisdiction over coastal ocean space had confused and complicated the application of customary international law. A new consensus was needed to resolve disputes and
confront the phenomenon of “creeping jurisdiction.” The ﬁrst two Law of the Sea
conferences, in 1958 and 1960, failed to resolve major disagreements about the width
and nature of territorial seas and other jurisdiction zones, or to develop consensus
and produce cooperation around issues related to high-seas ﬁshing.
During the third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, which took place from
1973 to 1982, representatives of over 150 states convened on 11 separate occasions
to discuss the terms of UNCLOS. When the conference began, the law of the sea
was in a chaotic state (Beesley, 1983: 183). Existing customary international law
regarding the territorial sea had been called into question, and novel issues regarding
resource use were emerging in the absence of a clear legal regime. As a result, the
agenda for UNCLOS negotiations was very broad, including navigation, ﬁshing,
scientiﬁc research, seabed drilling and mining, the laying of seabed cables, marine pollution and territorial and jurisdiction claims. The basic goal was to produce a “package deal” treaty that would clarify and codify customary international law, establish
new rules for emerging uses and ensure the sustainable and equitable use of ocean
resources. Because of their scope, the UNCLOS negotiations produced diverse and
shifting coalitions from issue to issue. Because of their length, the position of any given
state could change with turnover in government administrations. And because of their
broad international participation, negotiators and diplomats needed to balance a number of underlying divisions and antagonisms between North and South, East and
West, and coastal, maritime and landlocked states. Despite these challenges, the conference managed to produce a Law of the Sea Convention covering all major issues,
which would eventually win broad support from the international community.

Territory and Jurisdiction Zones
The territory and jurisdiction zones created by UNCLOS are a central feature of its
legacy. These zones specify the duties and rights of various parties and determine
who can legitimately access which resources. The seabed is divided into two types of
zones: the continental shelf, which belongs to the nearest coastal state (up to 350
nautical miles) and “the Area” which is designated the “common heritage of mankind”
and managed by the International Seabed Authority (see later) (Article 136). The water
column is divided into four types of zones: the territorial sea, contiguous zone,
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Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and high seas (also called the “Area Beyond
National Jurisdiction”). In general, the closer a zone is to the coastline, the more
control a coastal state has. This section will brieﬂy survey the basic features of the
water column zones. Seabed zones will be reviewed in the following section, in conjunction with the instruments created to deﬁne and manage them.
The national jurisdiction zones created by UNCLOS are delineated with reference
to the “baseline,” which is normally drawn at the low-tide line as represented by ofﬁcial charts of the coastal state (Article 5). Special provisions exist for drawing baselines along coastlines with a high degree of topographical variation, and for
archipelagic states made up of a large number of unevenly spaced islands (Article 7
and Article 47). The text of UNCLOS does not specify whether baselines shift in the
case of dynamic coastlines and newly constructed or newly submerged islands (see
Chapter 18 for a detailed discussion).
The territorial sea extends up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline (Article 3).
It is deﬁned as an extension of coastal state sovereignty, and has been recognized as
customary international law even for nonparties to UNCLOS (Noyes, 2017: 94).
Sovereignty over the territorial sea includes the seabed, the water column and the
airspace above the territorial sea, but the exercise of sovereignty is limited. Coastal
states have duties to provide information about hazards and regulations to nonnational ships, and they must allow all navigation that is “innocent passage.” State
parties disagree about whether military ships, nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying hazardous material should qualify as “innocent passage” (Noyes, 2017: 99).
Another condition on sovereignty in the territorial sea applies to the situation of
international straits, through which coastal states must allow “transit passage”
(Article 38). Transit passage through international straits allows submarines to travel
in “normal mode” (submerged) and permits the overﬂight of nonnational aircraft.
Unlike “innocent passage” in the territorial sea, “transit passage” cannot be suspended
by the coastal state.
Beyond the territorial sea lies the contiguous zone, which can be claimed up to 24
nautical miles from the baseline. In the contiguous zone, a coastal state can “exercise
the control necessary” to prevent and punish the infringement of customs, ﬁscal,
immigration or sanitary laws broken in the territorial sea or on state territory
(Article 33). The coastal state is also empowered to protect objects of “archaeological
and historical nature” within the contiguous zone (Article 303).
The 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone is a novel and extremely signiﬁcant contribution to the law of the sea. After the initial wave of major unilateral claims from
Latin American states in the 1940s and 1950s, developing and newly independent
states in Africa latched onto the concept of seaward extension of their territorial
rights. In 1972 Kenya presented a working paper titled “Exclusive Economic Zone
Concept” to an Asian-African Legislative Consultative Committee. It was this group
that brought the idea to the UNCLOS negotiations. The EEZ concept was supported by developing coastal states as a way to protect their offshore resources from
long-distance ﬁshing by developed states (Scott, 2005: 33). The 200-mile EEZ gives
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states exclusive control over water column resources – most notably ﬁsheries – for
the purposes of exploitation, conservation, and management (Article 56) (see
Chapter 18). EEZ jurisdiction is conditioned by the freedoms of navigation, overﬂight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines by other states (Article 58).
States are not obliged to demarcate their EEZs, and those that do may run into delimitation challenges because of overlap with the jurisdiction zones of other coastal
states. The convention offers several options for dispute settlement, reviewed in the
next section of this chapter.
Another area of potential disagreement in the creation of jurisdiction zones is the
status of small islands, such as those found in the South China Sea. Islands that are
“naturally formed” and never completely submerged can generate a territorial sea,
contiguous zone, EEZ, and continental-shelf claim. In contrast, a mere rock that
“cannot sustain human habitation or economic life” can only be used to generate a
territorial sea and contiguous zone (Article 121). State practice regarding the distinction between rocks and islands is infrequent and inconsistent, such that there is no
clear interpretation of UNCLOS and no coherent customary international law
(Churchill, 2005: 106).
The “high seas” encompass all parts of the ocean that fall outside the other jurisdiction zones (Article 86). All states have rights to navigation, overﬂight, laying of
cables and pipelines, construction of artiﬁcial installations, ﬁshing, and scientiﬁc
research, among other activities in the high seas (Article 87 provides a nonexhaustive list). The convention invalidates any sovereignty claims in the high seas,
and it reserves high-seas areas for “peaceful purposes” (Article 88). Enforcement of
international and national law on the high seas is the purview of “ﬂag states.” There
is a limited “right of visit” for a warship if it suspects that a nonnational ship is
engaged in piracy, slavery or unauthorized broadcasting, or if the ship is without a
nationality (Article 91 and 110).
Instruments for Implementation
Several UNCLOS provisions associated with navigation, safety, and pollution obligate states to observe the rules of preexisting treaties and organizations. The convention also created three new instruments to facilitate implementation and resolve
disputes among state parties: the Commission on the Limits of the Continental
Shelf, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the International
Seabed Authority. The features and functions of these institutions help make
UNCLOS an evolving and adaptive institution.
The Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) is a technical
organ established by Annex II of the convention. Its purpose is to make recommendations about the application of Article 76, which uses a complex and highly technical formula for the establishment of the outer limits of the continental shelf. Coastal
states have the exclusive right to exploit the natural resources of their continental
shelves (Article 77), so they have an incentive to maximize their continental-shelf
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claims. The 21 members of the CLCS are persons elected by states parties every ﬁve
years, and those members must be experts in geology, geophysics or hydrography.
Although the treaty does not precisely specify representational criteria for CLCS
members, the parties have implemented an equitable geographical distribution
scheme in the members’ selection process. Commission members “serve in their personal capacities,” and each member is funded by the state party that nominated that
person for election (Annex II, Article 2). The convention also encourages the CLCS
to cooperate and exchange scientiﬁc and technical information with other expert
bodies, including the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission of UNESCO
and the International Hydrographic Organization (Annex II, Article 3).
States seeking recommendations on the outer limits of their continental shelves
must submit their claims and supporting scientiﬁc information to the commission
within ten years after the convention enters into force for that state (Article 4). Since
UNCLOS entered into force, the meetings of the states parties have effectively
amended this provision to extend the deadline for submissions and to allow the submission of preliminary information to be considered and commented upon before
the ﬁnal submission (Churchill, 2017: 43).
In addition to the commission, UNCLOS provides multiple options for the settlement of disputes among its member states. These include adjudication by the
International Court of Justice, two types of international arbitration and submission
to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as established in Annex VI
(Article 287). Although states are obligated to resolve disputes via peaceful means,
they are also permitted to exclude some issues from compulsory dispute settlement,
including maritime boundary disputes and military activities (Article 298).
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has ruled on 25 cases
and issued two advisory opinions since its instantiation. Like the CLCS, the tribunal
is made up of 21 members with demonstrated competence in their subject matter (in
this case, legal affairs) and representing an equitable geographical distribution and
the “principal legal systems” of the world (Article 2). Tribunal members are nominated by state parties and elected to nine-year terms by secret ballot. A quorum of
11 members is required to constitute ITLOS, and decisions are made by a majority
of those ruling on a case. The jurisdiction of the tribunal is broad, comprising “all
disputes and all applications submitted to it in accordance with [UNCLOS]”
(Article 21). It also has special jurisdiction over provisional measures while cases are
pending and over situations requiring “prompt release” of seized vessels and crews
(Articles 290 and 292). Its rulings are only binding between parties to a dispute, and
they are not intended to set more general precedents (Annex VI, Article 33).
The creation of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) was the subject of prolonged contention during UNCLOS negotiations (Hollick, 1981: 287). The designation of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction as the “common heritage of
mankind” – formally afﬁrmed by UN General Assembly Resolution 2749 in 1970 –
required the creation of a central institution to manage seabed resource development. The ISA is established within Part XI of UNCLOS, which covers all activities
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in the area. Its basic purpose is to “organize and control activities in the Area, particularly with a view to administering the resources of the Area” (Article 157). In effect,
the ISA’s role is to manage seabed mining in the Area Beyond National Jurisdiction.
The ISA is an autonomous institution that became fully operational in 1996. Its
principal organs are an assembly, a council and a secretariat, all headquartered in
Kingston, Jamaica. All state parties to UNCLOS are automatically members of the
ISA, and all ISA members can designate one representative in the assembly. In addition to the adoption of general policies, the assembly elects 36 members that comprise the council. The members of the council must be elected from within ﬁve
different categories: the largest consumers of minerals (four members), the largest
investors in seabed mining (four members), the largest exporters of minerals (four
members), developing countries with “special interests” such as large populations or
land-locked status (six members) and whatever countries need to be placed on the
council in order to achieve geographical representation (18 members) (Article 161).
For disputes related to seabed mining, ITLOS convenes a speciﬁc Seabed
Disputes Chamber composed of 11 members of the tribunal, with a quorum threshold of 7 members. The Seabed Disputes Chamber has special jurisdiction over activities in the area, including disputes between state parties and the International
Seabed Authority (Article 187). In its rulings, the chamber is empowered to apply
“the rules, regulations, and procedures of the Authority” and “the terms of contracts
concerning activities in the Area” (Annex VI, Article 38).
Implementing Agreements
Alterations to UNCLOS began before the convention entered into force in
November 1994. Two “implementing agreements” were intended to rectify gaps and
problems identiﬁed in UNCLOS (Harrison, 2011: 86). The ﬁrst agreement – the
Implementing Agreement on Part XI – emerged from four years of informal negotiations spearheaded by the UN Secretary General. There was major concern that
UNCLOS would fail to achieve widespread acceptance – of the ﬁrst 60 states to ratify
UNCLOS, 58 were developing countries. The original provisions on seabed mining in
Part XI were perceived as a central barrier to universal participation in UNCLOS,
and the agreement aimed to win over nonparty industrialized countries who speciﬁcally objected to this section. The ﬁnal implementing agreement amended Part XI of
UNCLOS in order to strengthen the position of private investors and weaken the role
of the enterprise. This included watering down provisions aimed at beneﬁt sharing,
including technology transfer and the taxation and redistribution of mining proﬁts.
The July 1994 Implementation Agreement on Part XI was adopted by the UN
General Assembly as a resolution and was combined with the original convention
“to be interpreted and applied … as a single instrument” (A/RES/48/264). The
agreement is therefore only open to those states that have already ratiﬁed
UNCLOS, and any state that ratiﬁes UNCLOS after the agreement was adopted
must consent to be bound by both. In other words, states that ratiﬁed UNCLOS
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before July 1994 had to “opt in” to the implementing agreement, and states that
ratiﬁed after July 1994 could not “opt out” of the agreement. Thus far, 146 states
have ratiﬁed the implementing agreement in Part XI.
The second implementing agreement did not nullify, replace or amend any parts
of UNCLOS, but rather clariﬁed, elaborated, and modernized the provisions relating to ﬁsheries management. The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the Convention Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and High Migratory Fish Stocks (“Fish Stocks Agreement”)
focused on the regulation of highly migratory ﬁsh stocks and those that straddled
the national jurisdiction zones created by UNCLOS (see Chapter 11). (Unlike the
Implementing Agreement on Part XI, the Fish Stocks Agreement is a freestanding
treaty that can be ratiﬁed by nonmembers of UNCLOS. It entered into force in
2001, and currently has only 82 member states.) The original convention simply
enjoined states that ﬁshed for straddling or migratory stocks to cooperate over their
management (Articles 63 and 64). This requirement was seen as inadequate for effective governance, a fact that was formally acknowledged in the Agenda 21 document
produced by the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development. In 1993,
the UN General Assembly convened a UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Stocks, which after three years of negotiations adopted the
Fish Stocks Agreement by consensus in August 1995. The agreement was welcomed
and promoted by UN General Assembly Resolution 50/24.
The Fish Stocks Agreement reafﬁrms the duty of states to cooperate in ﬁsheries
management and to use the best scientiﬁc evidence available (Article 119). It adds
two principles of sustainable development to UNCLOS: the precautionary approach
and the ecosystem approach. The Fish Stocks Agreement obligates states to consider
uncertainty in scientiﬁc information about ﬁsh stock size and reproduction, and the
impact of other marine activities on target and non-target species alike. It also
requires states to generally “protect biodiversity in the marine environment” [Article
5(g)]. The Fish Stocks Agreement explicitly addresses the functions and features of
regional ﬁsheries management organizations (RFMOs) (described in detail in the
next section; see also Chapters 9 and 10). One of the most controversial elements of
the Fish Stocks Agreement restricts ﬁshing in RFMO-governed areas, or ﬁshing of
RFMO-governed species, to those states that are RFMO members [Article 8(4)].
Member states are also empowered to engage in enforcement actions against nonmember states violating RFMO dictates (Articles 21 and 22). Some nonparties to
the Fish Stocks Agreement argue that these provisions undermine the principles of
freedom of the high seas and ﬂag-state jurisdiction (Molenaar, 2011).
Upon the completion of the UNCLOS III conference, the president of the conference (Tommy Koh of Singapore) declared the creation of a “comprehensive constitution for the oceans which will stand the test of time.” The description of
UNCLOS as a “constitution” is appropriate given its comprehensive scope, widespread participation, hierarchical relationship to other institutions and embeddedness
in the overall ocean governance regime (Churchill, 2017: 45). Although the convention
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certainly has its failings, there is currently no signiﬁcant interest within the international community to replace or signiﬁcantly revise UNCLOS.

Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
RFMOs are autonomous organizations formed by agreement between a group of
members that self-regulate their exploitation either of a particular species or of all
commercial species within a particular area. Some RFMOs only have an advisory
function, but most have a management function. They are open-membership, and
they only create legal obligations for their members. There are around 18 RFMOs
(the exact number depends on the criteria used), and they have become the preferred
vehicle for fulﬁlling UNCLOS obligations related to the conservation of living
resources (Article 117 and 118) (Rayfuse 2015: 440). Although each RFMO is different, common management tools include data collection, dispute settlement and limitations on ﬁshing technology, capacity and effort.
RFMOs are widely understood to have failed at their primary task: maintaining
the sustainability of ﬁsheries (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly, 2010). Although the Fish
Stocks Agreement requires the adoption of a precautionary and ecosystem-based
approach, RFMOs remain deeply ﬂawed and have only made negligible progress in
adherence to these principles (Gilman, Passﬁeld, and Nakamura, 2014). Fisheries
management organizations are particularly subject to the problem of “regulatory
capture,” whereby regimes are controlled by vested interests seeking to justify existing practices (Gjerde et al., 2013; Barkin and DeSombre, 2013). Many ﬂag states
simply do not become members of the RFMOs that regulate the ﬁsheries that their
nationals exploit. But ﬁshers from RFMO member states can easily register in
nonmember states to avoid regulation (Barkin and DeSombre, 2013: 32). Although
the Fish Stocks Agreement authorizes RFMO member states to enforce RFMO provisions against nonmember states, this only applies to situations where the nonmember of the RFMO is a member of the Fish Stocks Agreement (Molenaar, 2011:
205). In general, little or no effort is made to keep nonmember ﬁshers out of an
RFMO area. The problem of RFMO management is summarized succinctly by
Samuel Barkin and Elizabeth DeSombre (2013: 9): “a common pool resource cannot
be successfully protected by a sub-group of users.”
Advances in ﬁsheries management aim to redress the insufﬁciency of RFMOs.
Efforts have focused on making ships more traceable at sea and more accountable
in port. The 2009 Food and Agricultural Organization Port State Measures
Agreement has the explicit goal of blocking the ﬂow of IUU (illegal, unreported,
and unregulated) ﬁsh into markets. It allows port states to deny entry to foreign
boats suspected of illegal ﬁshing and to require detailed documentation and inspection to ensure the legality of catches. Despite these efforts, the persistence of “ﬂags
of convenience” and “ports of convenience” make effective governance of global
ﬁsheries an extremely difﬁcult task (see Part III of this volume).

40

Elizabeth Mendenhall

Conclusion
The heavy and complex architecture of the contemporary ocean governance regime
represents decades, even centuries, of investment in diplomacy and legalization.
Although lauded for its comprehensiveness and universality, the UNCLOS-centered
regime can be criticized for its lethargic response to emerging issues associated with climate change (see Chapter 20). In particular, jurisdictional boundaries tend to assume
that the ocean will not change fundamentally. The law of baselines, from which the territorial sea and EEZ are calculated, does not account for the possibility of a dynamic
coastline. Whether the baseline shifts with rising seas remains an open question (see
Chapter 18). The “regions” of RFMOs reﬂect the spatial extent of ﬁsh populations and
ﬁshing practices, which may shift in response to warming seas (see Chapters 12–14).
Even the most successful parts of the contemporary governance regime fail to address
risks associated with climate change. The London Convention and MARPOL are narrowly focused on vessel-source pollution, without any provision for land-based or atmospheric sources of harmful emissions that cause acidiﬁcation. In general, current
environmental protection efforts aim to prevent over-exploitation by human users, with
little attention to more diffuse threats to marine habitats like warming and acidiﬁcation.
The breadth and depth of UNCLOS represents a substantial “sunk cost” for the
international community. Because there is little international enthusiasm for replacement or substantial reform, collective problems must be addressed within the basic
framework established by UNCLOS (see Chapter 16). Whether adjustments and
augmentations to the existing regime will be sufﬁcient to confront issues associated
with climate change promises to be a key question for the twenty-ﬁrst century.
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